

6-20-12

"Defensive missile"

approval absent -  
lies -

is ignore that  
Cuba missile  
defense

EWG not just  
and two areas +  
troops immediately;

SATs openly

and if "warnings," with  
ignore - don't lie -

Went back

or say, "Shots on  
right" —  
if blockade

(K didn't seem to  
worry that either  
lies or saying  
could have further,  
serious, <sup>punts</sup>,  
consequences  
revealed

("duplex" - J & K)

SV actual as of  
these issues & trans  
were not  
granite or  
thinkable!

---

No one on ~~E~~ SV  
or Cuban side  
simultaneously (or, better)  
expressed risks /  
difficulties of program  
(by were mistaken and  
US threat!)

and explained  
how to deal with  
them

To a near-time  
degree, there was  
a degree -

either than 143000.

Was there a need  
a belief?

W/ Nov. rather  
the Dec. for



Hyp:

K was entitled  
of "2d" on —  
between and

Berlin — and is a need!

(The Group &  
two were underest  
any claim that  
defense was only  
and : as an, "forming"?

~~My A~~

No discussion -  
what could / should  
K have done? C?

K general plan was  
sound -

His tactics were  
timidly flawed -  
he could easily have  
killed it off -  
hence, and on other,  
dying on Oct. 22.

Money was very  
cheap on subs.

- VCS on incursions

+ attack on op units

(and airbase alert -

[for FS, really?

ODI/SAFE! EXCom!

- K - many of too

Waco + Troops -

1 (combined with MRBM's)

- prevented invasion

- forced to deter

- forced to explode

- use intrastats

use Torpedoes

(used as MRBM's [or CBM's!])

C-20-12

Pressure & blockade,  
middle area  
in Aug - Sept - Oct

came from Lyons  
is Cyprus + public of  
Meyerson + mission  
plus

Leah outside E46  
(+ Arnie) wanted to  
average C-I or  
replace Centro?

A personal vendetta!  
(+ US Agency in CA + LA

K program was  
not crazy or  
unreasoning useless  
(we should have been  
early foreseeable  
legal, justifiable + JUSTIFIED  
(by GW standards, US  
but badly done, ~~argument~~)  
(except for ~~things in court~~)  
(living, lies / assurances)  
serving of the rules  
+ SAMs

(yes, MRBMs were  
part of defense — of  
China — not part of  
defense of SU (like  
Turkey))

It looked crazy  
(unfamiliar) &  
Nekless  
(or ominous)

and because of

1) US merely also  
negotiate + invasion plus  
~~of~~ - public / Cong /  
(an ODI) ignorance;

2) CW standards in US:  
"We're entitled"

to an "little  
sphere" (Hull)

- Misconception of  
Comm regime in  
Cuba, legitimizing,  
status quo

- Mexican Doctrine

- SO "informing"  
ignoring threat to  
Europe, i.e. - US bases  
& troops in Europe, NATO

Berlin "rights"

(no Cuban/SO  
rights)

Never — no inhibitions  
about morality, legality  
of blockade  
attacks  
warships

[op Plans!)

or CIA, assass.  
(Kremer)

or mercy / lies about



(seemingly  
justified by  
"threat" of MRBMs  
(stealthily deployed...))

---

Enough crazy, makers' -  
to think <sup>SD</sup> you could  
allow unsubstantiated  
news on Cuba  
& keep missile fields  
for ~2 months (Sept 8 -  
Oct 28)  
- no plan in case of discovery

3 - but if the war  
was should be  
limited (to what?  
ocean? borders?  
Cuba?)

for war-fighting,  
not defense?!

(What if the war in  
Europe had been  
shorter?!

[as was suggested!]

Don't lose sight of the  
in the future? / like the in Cuba.

[Wf was McN  
so afraid lot  
right?

Wf couldn't VFR  
Carrill Corbin fly  
in more than Rank?  
(steer?)  
Wf not McN?; Belt?  
(RFR appeared! Sen?  
O'Donnell!  
McG appeared!

Jfy wanted, what?  
Engage blackhawk?

WHILE CASTRO SHOT  
DOWN MORE PLANEES?!

Hyd: JFR <sup>was</sup> ~~did~~ not  
infringe his (REF)  
working on AA/5  
medical work?  
(He was MCH).

Was REF?

Why not have Steve  
propose to US Govt?  
Lack?

Denying Steve was  
a JFR lie, common  
"Pro bad refused truth).

Did Castro fire  
early morning?

Any bits?

presented  
"Kerosene from  
VX" (from C-II)

C. the prolonged  
training & his  
about C-II  
& exposure

which persisted  
throughout lead-up  
into VX, 1946-65,  
2 years later (some  
guys) - 1968 1969  
and into PP period  
1971-75

no break thought (200?)  
until 1987, 1989, 1992+  
(1982 some guys into/assess)

38A

mission plus

delegation (1964

(in K 1962:)

(Kun 1960!)

targets / ult.

protection

(Northwards)

areas (1963)

(in Centro:)

as late as 1971, we're  
interpreting them as if  
from the ...)

6-20-12

WE PROVOKED  
C-II

(LIKE T6!)

and fooled large part  
of USG, even DDI!

(did DDI understand  
T6?!) )

1969 - we had no  
basis for understanding  
the strategy or tactics  
(~~found~~ fooled by recipient,  
of Mustang)



(If Ann has now  
wonder now —  
would be  
meaningfully now?)

(or if Greg but, in  
1991!)

(By other cases where  
an attacker came so  
close to a surprise  
as C-II? (OK random?  
ULTRA)  
One too was  
seen found on embryo. sp!)

Was there "no  
chance of a  
US mission?"

(certainly) <sup>1987</sup> FR would  
see franks despite  
threats more  
about-does

expectations  
(USG!)  
desires (VCS...)

(unless DEF approved:  
+ Boyle.)

(McN?)

Wf not operational  
MRBM's run the out?  
For McN, others?

6-20-12

To McN:

"Why would you  
have thought US  
was about to attack"  
if you were in  
Moscow?

and why didn't  
you see this at the  
time?

[did they really not?

No written or reported

hint of it, before

(1975? 1987-November?)

and? ROK; Leites; Lee; Allison

We had NO right  
to violate Cuba —  
before 1961

before Oct 1962  
after Oct 1962

[direct intent was; or WITH—]

straight aggression

(like drug <sup>2003</sup> ~~1983~~)

(or drug-Kennedy 1990

drug - from 1980

SU - Afghanistan

(Anwar, but...)

IVK 1980

drug 1986

(Anwar?)

Attacks on Iran  
by Israel or US  
(as Dargan!)

would be a disastrous  
costly & reckless  
& unnecessary

Crisis of aggression

(No one - but GG! -  
is saying this!)

(Who in USG is speaking  
and like ex - Ambell  
Chavez in Israel?!) )



Is there such a  
thing, a crime,  
as aggression?

(Does ICJ recognize  
it?)

Does Iraq 2003  
fit it? (or attack  
on Kuwait? Why was  
SA not charged  
in 1990-91? or later?)

Doesn't Iran fit it?  
CAN or US Pres <sup>be charged with</sup> ~~commit~~  
aggression? or any other  
war-crime? or international

Would it be  
"self-defense"?



C-II

Admission

Triumph of  
sheer dumb luck!"

Yes: but...

CW - look of WWII

Ronald Steel on RFR '69

NYRB

Balance of Terror

Chancell

"the Thistle..."

B-52s to cons. airports

in Glants (see 1961 serials!)

VFR from of Tank arrival

Oct 24 - VFR no control

(avg. minimal is true?)

See rules!

Was attack "possible"? see Hanks

What would VFR have done, if  
ult. registered?

See (PBM) view to "Makers Street.  
balance" after Shank  
= K!

VFR did not provide out to Wiberson with  
internal affairs of Gabe - as K asked.  
(see VFR letters) VFR did attempt:

VFR wanted IRBNs cut - WHY?

Did anyone ever say: What if it  
put them in Cuba?

or, what if he excuses for K?  
(as he says!)

Wg RER cut - "by tomorrow"?

- so VFR could use Cardin  
play before Tuesday - a lovely  
or Monday morning!

- Kennedy's notes over subjected unbalanced  
(A intell. improvement from Oct 87,  
89 - Moscow, 92 - Havana  
(SCI - Moscow! ...

IRBNs on Cuba - unusable - yet  
a threat to US - which hardly  
existed earlier, ES or S-S!

(yes, CBMs like sun - but  
they hardly had any!)

esp. in May '62



No evidence or testimony that K  
had a plan for "if war was  
discussed

(as if VCS willing to attack op.  
+ Pres minors!

As RFR threatened!

Still don't "know" K's judgment of JFK  
after Vietnam

Cousins: SR 10 15 77

[Even all said (?) JFK would go  
all the way if he had to

[if K rejected JFK letters  
and private talks -

stroke with Sat. letters!

We attack! (RFR implies)

False - but as criticism of  
its being true - comparing  
ult. What if it didn't have  
a bluff? Did US have the  
right to attack?

NWOT

We are all in the same boat.

(K) speech: some are mortal

(Belief that one side (US) could  
win a war.

(K: both...) wrong

Small of being by in the air IC

Several of Danaher

(over SU - Shakunarak)

K rejected JFK reaction if  
he found united non-sp.

(did a

Did JFK really reject SU motion?

Could th?

(Can + direction!)

McX lie about "no plans"!

Shak - w/ <sup>me</sup> threats vs. SU?  
(not w/ Cuba)  
(but see ... Berlin!)

(Humm was Udon)

(Supposed intent to invade  
Germany?  
West Europe?)

Was there comparable intent/  
plans in SU to the US plans  
in Cuba

or not?

a total myth?

misunderstanding?



Ans! (Drew Pearson - her Coup  
Why no peace treaty with  
Khrushchev, after 16 years?

Was West position in Berlin  
"abnormal" or not?

(Peace treaty with Khrushchev?)

What could US / FRG have offered?

C-I  $\Rightarrow$  C-II'

via JFK invasion plans!

How did K arise up C-I, + JFK?

Answer, Parity: C-I

Extermination

JFK & K - "We are equal." (McN Amara  
~~that~~ - JFK

but didn't act like it,  
practically, in Berlin + C-II

By describing us as a status quo power  
giving an idea to  
expand into Cuba!

(C-I in '61)

(That was no '61'! '50s')

That was all behind us!

(✓ Behind that!)

and: we wanted S.G. in Berlin -

but K feared a change in the  
S.G. in Europe:

1) West German desire for unif.<sup>3</sup>

K did not see West

(? Eff. Admiration?)

Germany as a S.G. power!

Did he protest?

(Why?) (We didn't

Planing?)

see Castro that way)

(Thankless)

2) Threats in GDR, East Europe

(Reppel)

3) Possible NATO/Komm involvement

roll-back

4) Komm are unreliable

(But he was promoting that! Like

GWS SWOT - missing Herzog... Dances...



Patterson

What was the S.G. we defended  
in SUA?

(Hustones; Iran; Indonesia;  
long after conf; Brazil; Chile)

CR

f: ~~containing~~ generation

(JFR: + 10 years behind, half-generation)

Accession of Rev "CW"

? Kennan in 1959 - for designation  
for Central Europe (vs. Balkans)

JFR Oct '61: SU "aggressive conduct"  
(What " " ?)

[<sup>1</sup> But critics ignore

- JFR did have ~~hand~~ advisors + warning

- he did reject this advice; (VCS...)

but did "have" to give the situation, + help  
+ threats

- What if N had been in? (O.C.A.)

VFR as CWarrin  
(anti-Comm clubs, spies)

(not Stevenson?)

or Hollnath (a friend?)

Bowles (Bollen?)

(or Fiddler, Mansfield, Kennan)

or Kippin or Eleanor R!

"like N, she"!

/ get (there was a difference;  
observed by CBI internal...)

VFR wanted writing in TW (? Ross? VA?)

glt

my note: Repub observation: there is  
on Paterson

Did RFR want to interview, in C-I?

(Paterson 203)

(Lobbes, WNR (RG?) - anti-Comm

(McG 6: CW: Gabor, (Kleiner)

Critics (Steele, Pearson, Paterson)

was "TV spend rather than  
just defense"

"higher chance of war"?

(NO)

Culver: Hyp: assess, was always  
to occupy invasion

("It was not to replace him  
with Che" (was that?)

ignores Culver nationalism

+ Patent (?) for US support for Ratner

(see VN!)

we ignored what we had supported,  
to even Patent/discredit

[did DDI fully know?]

(ExCon types did + did not...)

didn't talk about it, integrate  
it into theory, use it to explain <sup>others'</sup> others'

K KNEW! (see Venus)



Reading  
6-17-12

But blockade was no more a  
demonstration of JFK's leadership, commitment,  
"drawing a line."

then advisors in VN

(Pearson minutes there)

13K-30K in 63 NO  
in 61

"He has to see your message."

(Presumably right)

"I froze it up."

U Thant

POL Blockade

Option

(bbs AA? SATs? RECON in VN, too)

Refrain from invasion? Taylor (WS?)

(Who opposed invasion?)

(then - no two areas used)

don't attack MRBM:

Was JFK that opposed to invasion - extends for

MRBMs?

Refute accusation to JFK in summer '62:

There was no limit to his  
accommodation, expression, concession,  
toleration

[Baron Woll; JCS knew (C-I), VN<sup>'61</sup>, Vienna  
"eye"  
[delegation; freedom;

"no line he would draw; "nothing that  
could get him to attack Castro

(Memorandum - how would that go  
over in 1962? In LA? Europe?

(biggest SO ?!)

That was what he "had" to say - and  
did, Sept 4, '63

(and he assured him...

(~~didn't~~ limit to Bob, Goldhamer...

as JFK limit to Stennis, C-I

and JFK limit to Thurgood - "no intent  
to mislead..."

C-17-12

hg

Was there a Russian equivalent of

"Peter should the Red" ?

[NO — We threatened PS, not (sure?) they!

(FU: Long; C-I (not Berlin...) C-II

"Rockets will fly"? Mues? FU? (No?!) )

|| before we threatened FU, after '45!

M. Throckmole

CW System (see note 143)



Have proceeding

145 (VFR demand to stop work & make  
minutes noticeable

was to open the to an attack!

(and to join too for... ~~Have~~ POL to work?  
no need for immediate attack

begin of this demand?

Both K letters Fri - Sat  
over major concessions of K -  
(gotta minutes out -  
didn't protest Gules, though  
too was did!

[W did K get Carter's letter?

but public trouble (OK with JFK)  
gave him a lot  
(not what he went in for!  
can help on Berlin!

being treated as equal

(symbolizing "we are equal in status  
(power)

(A real no-nonsense pledge was  
big concession for JFK -

What did JCS/CIA think of that?

(JG acted it! Oct 28)



6-12-12

Kerry - Oct 23 didn't just want to  
attack missiles!

What would that do?

- missile; col/o

|| (Provide response CUS etc!)  
joints S/O P-62!

CSO saw Kerry as out a  
~~big~~ states go down

but 2) in S-T conf., Bush

b) does

c) expansion!

(and personal influence of: Adelman (Strom)

JCS/CIA/MIC

Call:

and to President

More than that

Questions

files

VFR was willing to rejoin NATO

(into security deal)

C+US right wing? What was to - & Agree -  
saying during Oct 23-27?

(JCS unanimously against)

after only minutes [no answer?]

What if

|| Where was Congress - & press - (TV?)  
|| during Oct 23-27?

"Open crisis"

Dist Russell & Fulbright still  
want attack? France? Israel?

No circumstances? W/ not?

Would VFR have simply accepted  
(his!) Turk - Greek proposal on Oct. 27?

Could before? (Turk/NATO  
minutes.)

What did  
No earlier discussion of 1) delay private  
track; how to get Turk to agree (2nd?)

total lie —

"JFK never considered Treble"

— Hyp: Spared K the punishment —  
"you were bluffed."

(But it was Casper that did K in!  
with K's intelligence to tell JFK:

(secret)

or to "apologize for SU error  
on SAC" (wrong)

|

K didn't even know —  
~~forget~~ that was Casper  
throwing his accusations about MRBM's  
into question — on for K!

No analysis yet of implications of

K's knowledge of  $\equiv$

and lack of knowledge (SAC)

+ wrong about Casper (in SAC  
+ SO-SIOP)

(What if he had known about rule?  
of JFK deal!



& didn't give in because of balance.

+ didn't have to - by P401 Sunday  
(without further bargaining  
on Sunday)

Wf VCS let us VFR / Sunday?

(NATO security)

Donk "

Right-wing: VFR tough

(us. attack on his machines!

Who agreed down looked?

Did VCS know?

Did Taylor tell them?

Result: - No and to cover / begin

- ~~the~~ toughness worked

- Present: VFR did not begin

- Short of (over)run (LBS model)

(Realiz: VFR thought it was better

than attack; + was nearly ("tonnes")

Am VN '61: VFR expected massive attack

C-I; C-II VFR ready to expect about war.

Note: Caroline was Rosko's sister,  
and JFR;  
maybe JFR would not have...

RFK warning (ult.?) <sup>definite</sup>  
if you do X, <sup>on Monday</sup> tomorrow  
we attack  
(if not — but don't cancel) we  
go Tuesday.

Was RFK's ult. (24/48 hours)  
decision of "small group" — or  
known to them? Any of them?  
(Private Trade, yes)

If he had waited 8 hours (till Monday  
morning morning) he might have gotten  
trade.

USC willingness to take (risk: TCS)  
a small risk of TIV over  
in CW

(actually, larger than the Threat

say 10%

(is this "close"?)

(submarine. higher!  
missile " "

was "mod"

(but, evidently "human"

in 1960's! & '50's

(+ still a lower risk, but...  
for what?

compare: "6 in a million  
for other ignition

Dead Hand

How stop probab, terrorist risk  
when USC then <sup>cont</sup> its whole vote against  
spreads without moral message  
its whole influence  $\Rightarrow$  no further <sup>THREAT</sup> use; or exp. <sup>live with</sup>







- Tapes
- ~~the~~ <sup>no</sup> ~~con~~ con vention of
    - 1) oral matter
    - 2) Cuba's defense needs
    - 3) U.S. invasion plans
    - 4) Kennedy, exercise

VCS - ignore press. if UA of minutes

"low" work price - low if off

- McN - no attack if off (+ with blockade - to will be...)

- Refractor (his about convention  
How do we explain?

[Failure to fly  
0-2 of 29-Oct 14

Cognitive dissonance

Same process - in tapes, does (none in Sept?)

wake several comments

+ works "

Tendency to ignore, forget, one of these

"Same process will be repeated

+ want

general & local

ideal. + pragmatic

(Young Thompson on K

McNag on Castro

Castro

RFR - Hunt/Down

[Did VFR deal with RFR? O'Donnell, on

Young deal? (Secret <sup>00?</sup> run from them)  
+ McN (who agreed)

Trickle play - to VFR doesn't want to reject K paper  
RFR - on deal (His!)



NVA session trade at Anderson Oct 24

X cover about "signal" to sub

Cross - "uprising"

- split off Castro from SU

(Brazil play - Herobley)

"K cross about Berlin" [ Henry: news 1960

< London

PAL

of del cross about: Pearl Harbor

SU (CBM) + only analogies

It was Mexico Doctore

Berlin blockade 48 weeks

enclosing Berlin - giving what

an sphere; Arguing; too / Arguing

(Hall: an little sphere)

(this sphere: East Germany / Berlin

Germany?!)

border of area - in late '64' (VSA

"of some secret"! (Miguel?)

Bo of Pige ( "error"? )

"Change the frontier" that go

what was

→ to be like us!

error -

too small!

(Boris concerns) Delegation FU/FS thrust

Type II Out!

McC - give us taste of an on machine

(yes, it is a change,

us. Me IV)

(

Berlin! us. on FU

McK: Don't change on Monday; on Type I

doesn't give the story Type I

(well, highlight it!

Monday!

i.e. works on Type II

gives the same Type II (for Cuba)

+ again on

FU in Berlin!

(Not going on conventional press?

yes - in Cuba! a lot!

This find good for Type II!

and the find (real) capability

for it!"

Cons

Almost won!

Why did K think it was low-risk?

[My old enemy: election. [Did he think

Our own confidence is S.I! WWR - JFK shouldn't  
→ left 8, 13 evenings election?  
min before

(No one thought "too late"

WRONG!

Oct 20...

(see me + FBI)



Memor: "We don't allow foreign troops"

Rio Port? canak

(If no warning — no problem?

(McV)

NO

He would oppose about 4 — why?  
see NSR memo

"We said we would do this"

No!

SU about — if did wrong that he was  
about 11? TASS — get (K)

(K went over the line: Makagon was right! <sup>on US</sup>

Just Cuban efforts got Castro using.

My sp: K did that it was low risk —

somebody didn't know

(if found — VFR couldn't be sent for weeks)

VFR would have before election

Canak: VFR to McV on 16th:

while U-2!

"Can we hold it till election?"

on SU!

(II-28 : WHEN ANNOUNCED?

the lie / sent

Even?

K wrote:

WHO ON  
PSACM?

canak Southard  
alive??

hiding the

|| WG did he produce Porn??

Plus right May -

most dangerous man

(PK / Schles - Savigny ?

It was - but with K and VFR knew it!

Did K even know what was

happening with his rules?

Of course, communication was out...

What did CBI learn from C-II?

or McB B, McN! \* on rules?!

or N ? R ?

or the - advice to CBI on VN

Other points ?

[ K + VFR, yes

this lessons - trial about  
+ lost

\* 34A, de Soto!

assass.: (Diem!

Trujillo!

Chuck Bher 800-444-7437

Pittsburg



Security

For real secret

SI

Count ops All-Source

U-2

allies

op. channels

Neon

SR-71

(demote)

journalists Telegrams  
officials letters

Seibman

Cosmic

Water gas

Sensitive

(SOSUS)

SCI

James Hutto (subs...  
Kleinman)

"Confidential" - not like

TS "Need to know" - SCI <sup>unclassified</sup>

NOFORN

(not RAND)

OUO

EO ~~EO~~ No Dis Exch, Kin Dis

Chau

(Disrupt exist, except letters, telegms)  
Codebooks (Forrestal)

Now: FAX, e-mail, phones (long distance, local, foreign)

credit card; cell phone (locations: GPS) Skype

letters? FedEx, UPS

Phone companies web services

google search, Amazon Facebook

Pay Pal

(Channels for search? or, many...) Private intelligence cos.

It's hard for a president to get good advice--



5-18-12  
Friday 7:00 pm

~~Sho~~ ~~has~~

~~notebooks?~~

~~checkbook?~~

~~Kripton~~

Pat

BK / PK

6-18-12

JCR

K did expect (to contribute?) too we were  
(directly - ~~disrupted~~ disrupted - like  
our names!) DISMANTLE / DEFUSE

"Don't hit Hearts" or flirt  
Don't know to Hearts

We couldn't say "We have no plans - of  
kindness - of weaving Colours."

Plans were not been from 2002, (or VN, RT  
in 2004)

C-H = from but like from, 2006-12, now!

VFK was not someone who was willing to take  
actions that had / received the note to  
a  $\frac{1}{2}$  -  $\frac{1}{2}$  chance of we were

That a VCS, or some cells, were!

NOR was K - the VFK was trying  
as though there was a  $\frac{1}{2}$  -  $\frac{1}{2}$  chance that

K was (being acted so intentionally;

mounting, personally aggressive - and for his early shots

(before Wednesday - was was know intention?)

(after Wed, VFK had. But little been as was: part of intention (large)



Poham

Stearns - on Sat Oct 20 - proposes trade,  
Quintanus (i.e. recognize "equality" of  
rights, status, "before the law")  
- instead of act of war, not  
(or, leave the law!)

ignoring fact.

NATO leadership

(would NATO come?)

(NATO didn't know of his to JFK!)

"very 'ground room'!"

(DB - to explain why JFK was not  
secretly to build up:

(Well, why wouldn't he - if  
he did want mission?)

His intention was

original, went - to us!

Why Oct 2 mission,  
exercise?

2) for JCS - "other than"?

if as mission (i.e. if K & Come  
were) why Mayaguez at all?

Humbert?

b) went - keep operation open

[NO > 5 intention

Was it like: VN - he was  
determined not to? or C-I?

(or does? - unwilling, tell C-I;



Dist. - What we can say, with conf.

(b) - What we can't commit " " "

(2) US subject is VN; C-I; (moves over Berlin) - (STOP)

(b) mission before mission, as of Oct. 17  
out or 18

(see PSACOM - avoid by forced

Subjects however on Sept. 4 evening  
("If offensive turn up - by mistake  
is - to keep heart - and to choke  
back

Blockade - like Xmas Bowling

"shouty out of balance"

WPB

Hiroshima (comm; 50 city  
offer to Exp.)

to block turn of trade

(and public impression of same

general a deal - what had been  
possible).

Stew was done; right proposal

(expand offer "politics"

(Forrestal states his - for Pres - to even Pres?)

Oct 22 - objection was to a "capability"  
(= subs; or, ICBMs)

meaning - implication -

imp. for surprise, limited  
attacks OR ULTIMATUM.

VFR know neither was seriously intended?  
- whole idea!

What if: penetration a base  
or sub base?

"Manner Doctrine" (our implication)

- real attitude of LA?

NATO?

Why differ from SU/China?

"Because A (Matter) is so"

(Shut up, be explicit)

Motive for considering other alternatives to blockade  
or attacks ["if they get ready to fire..."]

- not only "blacks" not so risky"

but "what's Moscow?"

considering...

(see McC + LBJ on Aug 2, 1964...)

vs. "child's version of history"

(T. Powers, on Helms & CIA)



Blackhawk = JFK + CBI strat. for VN -

adopt <sup>probably</sup> defensive plan (C-I)

Reading of Japan

a) to hold down VCS - helps of more

did work -

b) might work - concave dip ("ult.")

Ho did

give K. Ben of loss

(public)

c) prepare for trade

on an attack

Not aware:

of control

bluff -

as is

Houston  
SB:

(concave dip on Berlin

Offshore islands

(EU threats?)

"SO/C 'deterrence' is a threat to peace/offensive  
(while arms, "defensive")

What was intent of Oct<sup>2</sup> - Oct 20 buildup?

(Note: Kelly - not of VCS? - (MCN?))

note

Commenced that negotiations were there?!

? Minutes of VCS/MCN meeting on Oct. 1?!

Revel?

C2 stay 1 3-7-90

6-10-12 Threatened under Paris

avoidance of (or response to) harassment

✓ Each was preparing, mentally, a great harassment of the other.

for K - the way he was doing it was sure to inflict maximum harassment on JFK.

It should have recognized this - but no indication that he did.

(JFK allowed to this on Oct 30, 1963)

No one (writing) in ExCom saw anything as a harassment for K - or a great regret, loss, concern.

[ "Carter's regime was a harassment in our sphere." ]  
(no more Berlin!) (not so, Turkey)

Did our McNamara see war as so ordered to defending Cuba? (All should have - esp. over

"If we are going that far to defend a regime from invasion" But which family regime was

(40) threatened? not Egypt, Indonesia.

(SAYs to NVN, 1965)

Yes, "missiles could be downed," BUT TAC NUSS - W TROOPS?



Strat. balance:

1. "SU couldn't fight in the Condo;  
and balance ~~was~~ didn't encourage  
SU to transfer superior to - places where  
they had a conventional advantage. (Berlin)

(If SU had superiority - as predicted  
for 62? - they could have.

But with points, (not US sup.) they could  
have used two axes in Cuba and kept  
their superior limited to Condo.!

With US sup. NO - we would  
use "windows of sup" to attack SU.

(Europe?!)!

(not coming - in

our own defense;

under attack

[But if K had surrounded 42K bases,  
with two axes

[still - black and white (there's?) an attack  
crisis

If attacked - response on Berlin? Walk in?

W/ not?

NO NWS has been attacked, in 67 years!

SU, US (9-11?)

(ignore U.K, E.; not China; NK [total, yes? 1967? 1973

BOR. Iran, Pol, since then?

log-2

SK, NK

Abraham 2

V-2, 1945

Panama, Panama



Sept. 5  
Blight / me / TOS - 1987  
Cuban takeover  
Elly's evolution

K not in charge  
of U-2 shoot-down

Aug. 87 - Rival / Corbin  
\ Kater - on Pearl, 87, Hawk's Bay

Notes on Blight, Aug 87  
\ Pearl 87

SE

---

Probs. not independent  
Cassole

Pinkish warning  
return of rabbits  
(Brownsville? new outbreak)

(Then permit her a full new  
catastrophe - get - later!)

It was "bad" but (over-catast.)  
that got minutes out - JFK was  
(without track, or attack)

for both, not only <sup>or</sup> K  
though, could have been gross!  
JFK



E. MA.

DE on Crises

DE - to Arrow - Risking Catastrophe  
Jan 87 (before Blight, Howard)

web?

UN-CH - CFR Paper 170 web?

- Swifts talk Oct 14-87  
SAM taken

I have reviewed/published this in 1976  
(11 yrs. earlier) to Paul Jacobs?

Notes on Hawthoff 89

My ex-ed Oct 81

Interviews: Chris Santhorne  
Gordon  
NITRE (available?)



lost this morning:  
SNE 11-18-12

Madoff - China Message

D's: approval of retail: WB K did  
how he right not  
not common

(on Oct 27 - he needed no conversion)

Madoff - sociopath? (compartmentalized? some  
(for himself - but not in prison) wide

How different a con game from Goldman-Sachs?  
other? (gamblers)

(None in jail) Enron

(Obama! Does he ask where his (their)  
money comes from, how it's made - or what  
the bag (from his opponents)?



Not a "miscalculation": SU+C fear of US invasion

(Get headlines - Mergose

Northwoods exercises

But unknown about convergence: (If did know  
at right: Unusual ... / small

Did miscalculate election process on JFK...

[Yes - degree of "reasonable, present view"

miscalculating dangerously - was repeatedly

taking what he see as small risks

(and looking means of advisors that under  
bigger risks)

gets considerably under-rating the  
risks

(and the risks he for the opportunity  
accepting - which again see him as  
small

SU did "change the pattern" - as

CIA thought unlike [not knowing of

Mergose - "the risks of inaction or

of old pattern, as seen by K - not

// unmistakably: K had known about

Mergose the ONE did! Chile!

gets did see risks as small...



What was Newmark saying?

Life? Fortune?

NVT?

SC did even if even, if blockade or attack.

Scot's last in Aug!

Romeo site? (Sept. 21-28 Eric)

crisis words?

(as common short news!)



what if looked?

San Jose Oct 5 (Sept. 29?) (before McN/VCS: Oct 1-2  
IL-28.3'

When was McN on invasion of Cuba in Sept.?

Coats: (Big camp/camping/assess. planned & forestalled  
of Coats, last work in Sept.?! Magazine?!)  
75 expected; 70 now off & on arrested,  
Mason's Lodge, 300 suspects  
CIA

McG B? VCS? Whelan, Anderson, LeMay,  
MCC? (CSC Aug?) Taylor?

Taylor

RFR?!?

No USG pressure to invade?

Halpatie?

Everyone against? until Oct 16?

Dellon?!?

(Notes: wf, just not it?)

(did JFR want to  
w/ NATO invade Cuba, join Revolution, allied  
LA supports (not NATO) in Sept-Oct?

Hyp.

Defence missiles

Was someone Malibu about  
invading?

blockade - allied ships?!

Iran on Berlin? - wf not

have since done?

Hessley

Was JFR really against invasion for longer months?

Despite "1962" / Magazine... RFR "Porter"



Sept-Oct 62

Like pressure wot. Iran!

Not one notion of any realty to Baker  
beats, changes

Iran, to defensive air!

C-I exploded (if Iran): JFK should have....

Ask: was horror absolute in 20th cent,  
2nd half — if it was?

(UN Chatter?)

("self-defense" of US?)

What made did JFK call for? just 150K?

Was JFK in '62 in same position as

N in '60 —

being harsh by the other to take  
a action he was secretly preparing?

(C-I in '60

Iranian in 62 — until Oct. (61)

(In both cases, JFK pulls back!)

Was JFK preparing on Oct. September (or, for mid)  
"3 mos". Oct 15

= LBJ? (or, N in 60!)

What would others have gathered —  
concerning to what N had said!

(Alleged...?)



see Election results 1962

(Caplan?)

Keston?

Rock vs. Magellan

Wilson Wyatt?

Eric ipv 2 should have been by one on C-11!

(New 29?)

|| How did Ex-Com Services change of minds?  
What did? Who changed? (McG-B-to bank!)  
(Dillon: Paul Harvey.

So to over over Berlin?!

and Cuba?!

K "bliss" — contrary to all thrusts (byoul!)  
beard down!

Credibility

"My good name" (Polanski)

"Honor"

"In prison, MacLaff  
is known as  
"Honor." (New York mag)

"Rob"

"Disseal"

(Dutch Schultz -

the Power - Rabbit

HAK on me: "unpredictable" 1969? 1970?



Was the course that succeeded, the right course  
(because it worked;  
others were costly (stew.)  
or would have failed)

or might it have been wrong (like some others)  
because of its actual risks, which  
were not realized (accrued) but were  
not — avoided by luck?

(Could risks have been reduced — avoided?  
(No) (?)

(See Hiroshima : "worked")

but still have horrific l-r consequences  
(compared to ... abolition? (?)

(Will would showing the CW? (never  
risks)

---

10-18 Learn: ults or tell to before (study)  
or not?

LIES of McN, McE, DeMunnison on invasion plans

[ R & L expectation of attack (from May '61) right!

Maguire, invasion Nov '61

K concern (not on ES/Benton (Hilpert on ES)

K decision in April, May '62

does he admit?

Seeger?

→ buildup, esp in Aug

SA-2s

→ Cong pressure (McConnell blockade attack

[ so what if the front is unstable?

No invasion!

Should JFK have "built that" Wall? Could he prove it?

What if not?

As if SU deal warning of DOS planning!

(What were Maguire's views - infiltrated -

Told of this?!

K was right about US (readiness for, "commitment of,

but for, exercises, for invasion after C-I: esp. from Nov

WHY THEN?



Monday

a U-2 flight that showed perhaps ~~was~~ but not  
operational ~~for~~ — but. Sept 4 (?) and Oct 4, say  
would (?) have led to an attack and  
blockade, and about same (mass. pres.) mission  
+ occupation — 40K losses.  
↳ move on Berlin, gain attack on Sov?

40 K losses  
the news → STOP!

↓ Delay (till miss. op-) want JFK/MCN  
determined not to attack

Why delay — since Soviets not operational?

(Why didn't JFK tell McN, Oct 27 (or earlier)?)

↳ McN (McG B — clear — Turkey  
didn't want to tell RFK?

Did he tell Reed — didn't tell McN?

Reed saved the world!

- + no count action!
- 1) The no-warrior pledge [though, "if nothing is done  
was a real conversion  
domestically (CVCS) — a big one — and bigger  
than Turkey (unlikeable to US)  
that Turkey would have been big to Euro, not dom.  
public trade
  - 2) Those who know that, would have approved.  
Others didn't think it was a conversion. (JFK lied,  
said it wasn't — to Dean, (K?))  
So — was discussed in ExCom (McGovern was intransigent)



Cognitive dissonance

bordering  
CGRP, HLC,  
"air" interests in TW

US is an engine — with all that entails  
tactical, across, camps, distalships  
at-wing regions, anti-local-rodem ("by of mass meaning")

US first Wave — and actual efforts of S.B.

was

drawn

grand tactics

torture

atrocities

East German

Saw troops into Berlin " = 6W" !

(Crazy)

(44)

K is sure of invasion (Wrong) <sup>But</sup> from '61

Thinks invasion soon in April, May (not so wrong)

X But sure to lose — not told after election

(McCauley not told after SAMs — wrong)

Actually, plans point to But

who sp.?

in March (Morgans (Northwards))

esp. from Oct 1 (SU is not opening up,

developing Crack II

(my hyp.: counts on PS&UM!)

(to be encouraged by lack of U-2,

from Aug. 29? to Oct 14?

see plmt, Oct 15 (U-2?)



K. failed in Berlin 1958-60  
1960  
1962

K. would own EU Thinks against us -  
with his 2nd-strike two ways, OYRRTS  
/ (perhaps?)  
vs. US two ways

+ his 2nd strike ICBMs? (not enough,  
in 1961-62 or 1958-60)

Attending Colson wants, to JFK,  
losing Berlin - not blockade  
into occupation! (and/or <sup>attack</sup> Pushing!)  
- GW! no - all ways falls apart!

Net: JFK to RFK Thinks man (Fair?)  
on blockade

Did K see "acting on (and to achieve) equality  
of right as preventing, disgrace?"

Check: ambiguous directions on defining two ways

Issue to distances: What would JFK have done  
if K rejected RFK ult.?

Why did JFK not expect RFK ult. to work?

~~Is~~ the thing it SAOM was deliberate! and AAA?

Carter was right! (+ two ways;  
though it should stop



Thursday  
Wining Carol

(till on 24, 25, 26 of the disembarkment  
unloads.)

him?  
long?

✓ St. Regis Paradox, Riff, Puzzle, Complex

OK (Pak?)

✓ (as if Kubik knows of two ones...

(two ones, over to be expected)

+ unsubstantiated - might not be  
there

✓ - WG not two ones expected?

for Cubans?

(no, for SU troops!)

(PROGS - OK (SU designations?)

- two ones for

non-feeding - like  
US! (under the?)

did he  
really  
believe it?

McN did  
not!

✓ C was right!

✓ Now only landing, in Cuba!  
"infeasible"

(no other on this landing, since French)  
Vigors.

K has been helping - on ones

+ thinks long; Berlin;

"did exchange us."

C-II; VN (McN)

(Kubik - feeding

Quincy - C-I

TASS Sept 13

"success" of gradual moves,

US-JCS (+ US - Stevenson)

(RFE more offer

"privately" - like Stev.  
on 23rd)

sure they didn't "remember"

things they didn't do

(as "forgetting"; q, writers)

Don more reliable

than, say, McN or McG



Friday 5-29-12

✓ Ackerson - Wake Man (division: Saint/Stephen)  
"Wise Man"

Wise to Hungary  
to Berlin

RFE (Wise Man, or not?)

Wise to Columbia (Charlotte?) on Wise

Wf not? (US role in Europe?)

Human role? SU fears - of wif., etc.

Just we were close.

Communist Party

Wf not to Berlin? dangerous?

Wf others in Hungary?

+SS-20

P2+CM were dangerous - but not the

Did CP not -

other ~~and~~ ones? Wf (SS-20 didn't threaten K. Dend Hord)

want to call for

Wf not general uprising w. FC/NATO policy?

NFU? or, out of love ones?

(see w. testing... Ackerson...)

Nat, NFU; strategy; sole use...

(Wf, what then for Europe?)

Wf didn't rest of world protest?

see UN in 1981 - NATO votes against

did the any it would be crisis?

or - "a dec. crisis to thrust!"

to come out?!



Why ~~do~~ we still study it?

Because it really did ~~almost~~ "come close"  
to ending life ("civilization" - <sup>not US!</sup> ~~not US!~~)

in our context:  
what does survive? What if:  
"Most" life - bacteria  
(What life depends on sunlight?  
indirectly)

What if: US survives, Southern Hemisphere  
No cities in SU or China or Europe, fallout  
EPT: balance sheet "It's did not seem  
to survive this."  
on evolution? Western?  
on "civilization"  
prospects

Only One man died (several signal is "fairfight"  
others  
- shots at!

Or did it come close? See opinion: Not.

Dillon; Nite (?!) Body, warrior?

(What if: warlords had not been sent, or drilled  
(TCS; McCone

See Chen

What if:

not what he says, Oct 16?  
Staff?

1) JFK = Netter + Rusk Oct 15 (if told 15th;

(McN: it's a political problem, not wif. dom; external?  
LA? NATO?)

[Wif does blockade "begin" dec. of war?

Wif does "war/declares" "formal" block?

What if no dec? Block, "illegal"? So what? Then what?

JFK: "We will not shrink from risk of GW."

2) Wif "not it"? - This not legal; + like Cuba (legal)

(though SU doesn't like Turkey or Berlin  
+ we don't like Cuba; or winners [or COMs?])

Wif D.M.?

D.M.

legal?

(ARE COMs "legal"?)

exclusion; restricts

general (GAC '89)

or MPRM

Is SAC legal?

see SLOP

Ant. Paterson, election

Also Bantlett

JFK: let Gene Post

→ Dulles, wife

(RFK (Schles, Lee, Albion (70?) didn't know

(what & knew:



mg 30-12

Suppose: JFK really knows from beginning  
(his strike is just a power in front  
of Diller + Taylor + JCS

(He knows he's got VCS a kind of  
straw or mission

(By Pet, if "know" missiles are coming  
(as there - as the case!)

Was OK'd thing, on invasion (Oct 2)

"if + and if they're present but not of?"

(What if the one? was discarded  
and are all there?

Permanent blockade?

UPR: Bando

Oil Rock - no. 0-2 - not want to find out  
(before election) if windows were there?

[ If K Deal wanted to introduce <sup>minutes</sup> (or put out in appt)  
till ~~appt~~ election — could use SAC to counsel?  
But couldn't hope that VPR could not  
attack during vulnerability.

BUT: what of insertion before electron?

- Actually planned (as controlling)

- K doesn't seem to have considered!

This is C<sub>2</sub> invariant: "K lines"

Kissinger { "JFK didn't want to declare the  
" " " attack Cuba"  
CORSPITE POL. PRESSURE, from EO/Rubley"



duplex Eric, R. H. ...  
VFR problem: - to draw VCS back from invasion  
with some or, to assist it

gully VCS more but = to use it as threat (not only  
destroy up ("Whelan") - to blockade "arts" ult.

already / (prepared!) give VFR time  
prepared to report

- to get OAS for blockade

- to get NATO open to track

this ... - to track (freq. under pressure, UN

(Wf should K track?  
He would advise them;

of Jock "offer" (Re)

of UN request

Wf do MRBM: deton  
attack (rather than  
nuclear it?)

track: "New Norm" - vs. MRF main - transfer

(Wf? on borders: so?

Short - time? (Hal

UA? Prof?

(give to Calvario, or ...)

UA; (more  
credible threat  
than (CBMS)

though not to VCS!

(but see SAM - U-2?)

Carbon control

(K business:)

(Eisen doesn't!)

- except "front"

(We're already in the hurry;

if we still not to be in over;

but with, MRBMs on borders

Berlin! "WWII" (is 1962!)

"hurd bottom"  
"unprecedented" - the more cautions; controlled over  
"seant

Side TG!

(unprecedented? Ha! Exercise, plus, CA (C-I!)

Big seant:  
JAP - PSACM  
No plans, as into  
marginal, assess  
isolation in OAS  
Northwards

was it "over, part"  
of not

VFR big to through



"No risk" : either "K lead to back down" (Wrong)

or : "North K or VFR wanted war (true)"

and: no real danger of VA (No)

JCS = blockade leads to war (didn't)

under much worse conditions

the partial blockade  
("Munich")

then full surprise attack (the didn't  
but didn't)

+ full invasion

and outcome (not just reply)

(loss, loss, loss  
guiltier war)

("NFK too to go"?)

PTB  
4/24/68  
Cuba, VN?

JCS advice: as bad as on: Korea Quency '58

C-I

VN '61

VN 64-65-68

(LB right, = Nov 65)

PDS: Does

Refutes

planning start this

(where were the

and? and 63?

coming from? front,

(VN withdrawal)

opposition?

Excluded without war.

+ with members withdrawal : OK pledge

Block. + threat of attack:

very illegal

(VN Chamber)

not, "self-defense"

(unless attack on them, they...

self-defense)

Retreat to fight

to K. (Was Castro  
assumed at all?)

|| How often withdrawal  
of troops + troops?

Castro reaction to that?

(or just symbolic?)



Earlier, JFK wasn't about loss of control  
But: for K and JFK: events were out of the  
control (K knew it) (SAM, AAA  
in ways that neither of the knew:  
Sule / Navy  
U-2 / Pursuit / Miss  
JFK suspected SAC? missile  
used  
S/Block  
He knew Kelly; Powers?  
Castro  
K suspected: SAM

Was man "crazy"? He almost won - big

How close was K to winning? "He almost did"  
during NATO? - 1) Principle: if he could be sure Castro  
wouldn't fire:

and two more

("let US have first  
shot" (too late?)  
blow U-2

(why did he try - not know)  
he'd failed - to keep C  
from firing?

When did he know how  
SAC was going?

" " " sub strategy?

during NATO - 2) Keep winners in Cuba only  
MRBNs started,  
- if he revealed (too much?)  
- if he followed (no mission)  
"best strategies"



## Best KC strategy

1. Secret deployment of all

2. No exposure of sites or ~~signature~~ until SAMs operational.

(When? when before

3. If invasion is close <sup>before 2 or election</sup> reveal too much before 7, if necessary; after 6-10

4. ~~Shoot~~ Warn SAMs will fire at violation of ceasefire.

5. If U-2: shoot it down & protest (SAMs may be attacked)

6. If low-level: AAA & protest.

as McCone  
expected

7. Install MRBMs (after election, unless SAMs can be spread up; not revealed by SAMs (eventually, SI)

No blockade

No attack

No invasion

Missiles stay : is longer numbers

8. Reach Berlin (No Berlin line?)

[We not just! We want reach Berlin before election.  
"No ahead"!



? True

Hypo: K wouldn't negotiate on Berlin in 1962 —  
he didn't want it / or need it  
He wanted to be able to threaten it  
a liability for NATO

a "Comm. Union"

(Joseph —  
in Russia?)

(We could threaten Cuba  
to draw more in Berlin!

But we wanted to take Cuba.

appeal to  
Khrushchev

What if K had responded to an Berlin  
planing with CANDOR about real  
consequences of GW for Europe!

(now, after <sup>NATO</sup> ~~NATO~~ <sup>CW</sup> ~~NATO~~)

(see Wilful Blindness!

Talbot — is 2 years (and a month or two)

Kills (potential deaths) 1 M

or all American deaths from all wars,  
including Civil War

[what begins for world?  
Rising China...]

The Hunt Denials

In 20 years — all deaths for war is 20% but  
(30-40 years: all wars?) (all massacres? Stalin

China - China

Line War

India-Pak war

Mao  
Hitler  
Pol Pot  
Sukarno  
Rwanda

Dogli Khan  
Tamil Nadu  
(Romeo?)



CIT was ended of a real concession:  
no - invasion

(regarded as no more a concession  
than "explaining" Turk mission with Polesis

would it be first if  
Turkey were attacked?  
or Europe?!

(not big war attack  
themselves)

What would Russell	Caplan
Fulbright	Kearney
VOS	Walter Fuld
Jayson	
Kitgo	
Dillon	
McCone	

Have said about invading Cuba if they  
had known about how was and troops?

McA -  
Zimo, 2003

If invasion looked bad on Oct 21 (to JFK, McA...)  
How could it have looked on Oct 27?

JFK on Flanery  
Oct '62  
+ Nov 63

[Would we have given more help to them?  
SEE 1964

Was RFR Ult, a bluff, a rat?

→ Henry, to?

\* Would JFK have invaded on Tuesday? (Lombard?)

LEN on night planes: "B200g"

(sub } war is on  
SAM }

me: - C-3 "pie"

- JFK - PT boat, run over by DD

- Carter - Vann raid

- Vann + me: B-52s

- "always seen SOB" (JFK)

- me + POW in Egypt (3.5" rocket)

- Dr. S /

- (US seen on beach at C-I  
killed?)



More Frankfurt

256-57 Answer: GW not free to threaten (bluff)  
or risk

like,  
Swining  
(not, clearly,  
Dulles)  
but to choose, as an instrument  
we were forced to use  
- to keep it, or  
- to avoid losing Berlin!

But even with: (for Berlin) "our rights!"  
Now just a hit?  
Wf?

(Because — we had "committed"?)

Was (even) a bluff justified? (270) BLUFFING INVOLVES RISK

(Dulles:  $< 1/1000$  risk. 276

(Was NATO at Stoke, or West Europe (Russia? US)

or American role in NATO?

2 different views of  
Hankins on Berlin & C-II:

Dulles, 276

- 3) "If we show weakness, SU will / must break down." (they are bluffing)  
b) "We must intimidate SU if necessary (goal!)"  
"We're not bluffing"

(+ K!)

Canine/de Gaulle  $\Rightarrow$  JFK on C-II (+ that): right time to

270 capitulate in the end, but must not do it prematurely."

Franklin had to look tough on Berlin — not take  
blame for losing it. (Good doctor?)

Keep NATO together,  
hold on to Germany



War with SU was not inevitable, certain

Not was, losing Berlin!

(not was, refusing Cuba; killing Castro!)

"If France goes over, Germany is sure to follow." NO

Not human moves inevitable

To risk (a threat, bluff) one war is one thing

dangerous, even crazy (reckless)

(like now: NO!)

(~~expect~~ to prompt?)

But to introduce it — as if that avoids

something worse

IS CLINICALLY INSANE

(what — to "avoid" big over-run, captured,

or killed (at my level;

[to "hint danger"? prompt

Berlin - Cuba

We wanted "non-invasion pledge" in Berlin?

(didn't the Russian US troops in Berlin?

(not? never)

310 MRBM<sub>1</sub> in Hungary → human control

(Want ~~them~~ strong (esp. with miss) threatened  
stability of EU Europe in East Europe

~ Cuba, esp. with miss, " " " of US Agency  
in CA + LA.

For K, losing Cuba was like, for VOK, losing Berlin!

Alt. approach to Berlin: negot perhaps deal — we get Berlin,  
they get ...

[What if Russians get more weapons? How

would this affect status of Berlin?

(US backs out; Russians w. miss (out of  
NATO)

Wf was not this threatened?

("If we give up Berlin")

305 Hungary about to get miss = Cuba about to get miss  
Determine no provocation (Premi Novbor)



// The BS of a nation being united (as attached  
non-united) is CREDIBLE CRAZINESS — Surinam? Indochina  
VA uncontrolled

(France; Hungary; Cuba; Germany...

K had his on Berlin in Aug-Oct 62:

Did K want to humiliate JFK — [in Cuba, he wanted!]<sup>\*</sup>  
— get ~~troops~~ out of Berlin (from MRBM's in Cuba)  
— destroy NATO?

But then: Hungary gets invaded,  
is uncontrolled —

he didn't want that!

Yet his "writing" will get it!

\* his lies could even hurt JFK worse;

- JFK a deep, credible
- treated with contempt  
of K...
- JFK's weakness defined
- Right right
- Intell failure  
(like 2-11, Aug...)



June 10, 2012

Big Miscalculation of <sup>Russ</sup> DDC + SE (Aug)

NBE thought "K wouldn't miscalculate

so much - US might make him

- he would get away with it

or be so reckless

but that K didn't come about  
"Boing Cuba"

(Would they have given him more to NVN?)

and wasn't prepared to "take out of

the box," take some risks, break pattern

(copy?), do something unprecedented

this otherwise - would have sense, relevant

- was the only thing that

might work, in, maintain status

yes, AVOID S-T CERTAIN LOSS

K/T! Minimization (personal)

take big <sup>not</sup> risk;

LIKE JFK!

regard loss as a catastrophe

CAMELO DOMINATES! (or if...)

well, pull-back

Handling With Catastrophe

some years later,

(Did I see this before)

can't win all...

"DON'T LOOK HARD AT

(K on Oct 24-28


2) How likely outcome is, loss

(NOT = GW


b) How bad " " "

but = risk of GW


("Worst case": ignore, LOSS is UNACCEPTABLE, INTOCERABLE, too - ∞
















Dobrynin didn't know of missiles  
(as Balabakoo)

Clint/Henttiff didn't know of MongOOSE  
or mission plans

McV Liss (to Mike.) on

Henttiff - he doesn't remember! (MongOOSE?  
invasion)

Thomson article

well, more

With 40/60 minutes in Cuba, Helphatue (she) is no longer  
clearly there — "our 2nd strike is greater than the  
first strike (air alert, Poland, some of 120? other-etc...  
Well...

My theory:

Why send SAMs at all — if you're not going  
to fire them? (and don't need them after  
missiles are shot down?)

Well — the deliberate V-2 flight! (Still, should have fired)

— and the deployment would require of missiles

analysis

which, combined with K assumptions...



Ex Comm - Big Stone 2/ keep the secret for a week

2) while you persuade Dillon, McLane,  
Taylor, <sup>vs</sup> to go along with a blockade  
(He hasn't worked on Russell or Filibert  
for a week)

3) on grounds it's only a first step - toward attack  
(not - toward & then on,  
towards..)

(Barthett says, "I was never going to  
travel - I was going to attack."

(+ the threat would

(not - the attack would not -  
invasion would have been a  
decision

(but alone: global catastrophe!  
Didn't know that!

and if invasion/air attack  
didn't put off NRBMs,  
too much

[but it might, so we  
wouldn't have seen that  
- of global threats to stay -  
travel..]



Oct. 10 Kestig <sup>egg</sup> though it was a fake cat!

"The cat is out of the bag

(before the real cat got in it...)

(well, as of Oct 10, 9, am I!)

There were officials who

believed reports of miracles!

i.e. PSALM was, in effect, revealed —  
what VFR feared!

(Who said PSALM go in?!

What was the use of PSALM, after Oct 10?

Of course always say, as the said of  
Kestig — "No official source — we have  
no evidence..."

(Of course afraid of leaks from banks —  
who know VFR didn't want to attack

[before election! K was right —

despite cont. blowing!

because of hold on U-2 — a last desperate!

U-2 could disprove agent reports, in specific  
places

[did Kestig tell where files were?

No



K couldn't do what he  
thought he ought to do - it's right,  
& reverse trade (or several more)  
→ <sup>US</sup> Attack - or just, mean - would  
lead to new exchange, prob. US PS!

Castro

two moves

REK double ult.

2 possible threats;

1 a bluff - we could blow her  
test.

alt - no time to test

(and it prob. was  
not a bluff in K's eyes  
and it won't.)

"Oct 26?"

in arrival,

Oct 27?

and he couldn't prompt,  
as Castro wanted.

(when did the guy  
to K - if later)

Shirley A. after meeting,

the ~10 AM Friday -

was it <sup>late</sup> Friday AM in Cuba,

10 AM on Sat? - (Shirley

Existence of new monopoly was likely (certain? without Spring  
to lead to test and attack action) (OR  
LEAR?)

will efforts Frank forward: SU Test

→ US/SU "race" [in absence of LEAR  
+ CANDOR]

But US reluctant on EU threats despite

loss of monopoly ("Mason threats!")

& boasts of power (Dullin)

- seems highly very likely, if not inevitable [KENNAN LEAR?

Even Office was  
not for NEU.

No first test?  
(LEAR) good



this US use - and effort success -  
C-119 Berlin

+ threats

not accept "inferior"

at SU would lead to "panic"

made it inevitable

also would want to get it  
OK, France (from 1956?)

- French

China → India → Pak

(Kargil, Pan...)

(US use at H+N - almost inevitable for S.B.)

not inevitable, but likely

likely (USAF, Churchill, FDR)

Marsall... Mitchell

aircraft industry...

likewise, Teluk - Ulu H-bomb (not the "begin")

But SU reliance on two axes

think of Apocalypse

/ also part of problem

End this

and no better motion

(not just Type I Dots - as for China,

(Holding on to - satellite

or SU initially

≈ US holding on to: Iran, West Germany (channel)

Poland, Czechoslovakia,

not "inevitable"

and after 1964 (200 ICBMs)

→ huge buildup, to D.M.

would to support

Admiral (US, Churchill)

needed for them (various)

+ division + NATO +

no axes)

all Polaris -

less likely to escalate,

"2 vulnerable D.M.s -

or to deter "set back"

implication to frustration,

despite this big pile as much as two axes in Europe!



K: Pure bluff & Swag

C-I Berlin

not good enough, is C-II & Berlin

"Can't beat something with nothing"

(Cool Hand Luke)

- Threat of loss of control

or (word) "character"

(~~Still~~ - say D.M.? "to escalate - on <sup>prov.</sup> promise of  
pumpkin, deep, CF, D-L

If either side is unstable (& delegate, if deep)  
then no threat of "raising the bet bluff,"  
incremental escalation - no limit to "escalation  
game (as in conventional war - VN)  
each side watching other's move,  
"up the ladder."

(If you can't "throw in all chips" (the)

C-II What News

Sharp contrasts between declared policy,  
publicly undertaken, ~~and~~ (Type I Dist)  
(fear of SU ES!)

and reality of USG + SU concerns

(Unreality: Cuba + Berlin)

X

see Frankfurter new book US Plans for Nuclear War  
+ Delegation, in Berlin (last to the + SACEUR)  
earlier, <sup>a</sup> Negotiated Peace 11

Write, the meaning interpreted



Each was bluffing -

Neither wanted invasion (or one was  
Neither wanted the war over a "small" risk. on Berlin conflicts (after blockade)

Each was determined to avoid above.

Each had more honest advisors, who wanted  
to see ~~and~~ action that appeared  
within the my taken.

But despite this - with their "caution" (risk-taking) the opposite was being?

- Each was ready to take what he saw as  
a small risk of BTW war.

(which was longer than ~~to~~ be thought)  
and believed he could control ~~the~~ results  
to keep it from getting large.

[Half-right, half-wrong:

1. Each expects his sense of  
control - and the other's

The "real risk" - 1) less than the (WFR/K; K/WFR  
would thought on Oct 22-24: from  
invasion

otherwise, 2) less than if some advisors feel  
before  
action)  
there is change; 3) great (2) - greater than either thought,  
OR WAS WILLING TO ACCEPT

$\frac{1}{3} - \frac{1}{2}$  prob. SU would go all the way to war now."

[as the end-point of a sequence of steps  
of both sides that either  
1) makes war very less likely  
to SU than non-war response  
(GW w/o "humiliation")

that JFK "might"  
be advised to  
take)

or 2) makes it "likely" that SU (or US?) will stand  
and war (reflex, accident...) (loss of control)  
(try - too late → GW)

or 3) confronts US with "humiliation" of TN war.

But even if intended to script choosing humiliation / provocation  
of the <sup>only</sup> alt. was a high-likelihood or moderate likelihood  
of any initiation of war was on GW. Neither expected, at all to initiate GW



Lesson of Strategic Communication: Media. 6-20-12

We plants  
as Terror Targets  
(Don Hirsch)

&

miss one out in good hands  
none of the

and they won't be  
(don't know)

Don Osope -  
Safety

This is not a species to be treated with

● Foundation

multiple weapons; multiple reactors; WMD's (S.B.)

No "good enough guys" or

but best guys & worse guys

evil  
less best guys